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‘It is stressful, it is frightening in lots of ways. And it’s very 
distressing that something you could work on for two years, 
can just, in a heartbeat, disappear…It had never occurred 
to me that something you put on the internet, doesn’t 
automatically stay there forever.’
Sabrina [Hacking, SME]
‘…so they left me with nothing, and then our mortgage was due to go 
out and other payments and nothing would have... And I was scared of all 
the bank charges and that, so I had to borrow some cash.’
Claire [Hacking, Individual]
‘I was frightened it was going to happen again. Yes. I was frightened that 
whoever had done that would know we were vulnerable and probably 
easy access and might find another way in.’ 
Kathy [Hacking, SME]
‘…knowing that I couldn’t take any money out of the bank 
because there was nothing left was a bit shattering.’
Sarah [Hacking, Individual]
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TABLE OF ACRONYMS 
CMC Computer Misuse Crime 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
ECVCU  Economic Crime Victim Care Unit 
CSEW Crime Survey for England  
 and Wales 
HMICFRS  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary, Fire and Rescue 
Services 
ICT  Information and 
Communications Technology 
NCSC National Cyber Security Centre 
NFIB National Fraud Intelligence   
 Bureau 
NPCC National Police Chiefs’ Council 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
SIA Security Industry Authority 
SME/O  Small Medium Sized Enterprise/
Organisation 
2FA Two Factor Authentication 
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INTRODUCTION
IN THE SUMMER OF 2018 RESEARCHERS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
PORTSMOUTH WERE COMMISSIONED BY THE HOME OFFICE AND HER 
MAJESTY’S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY, FIRE AND RESCUE 
SERVICES (HMICFRS) TO RESEARCH VICTIMS OF COMPUTER MISUSE 
WITH THE BROAD AIMS: 
• Toexaminethenatureandimpactofcomputermisuserelatedcrimeonvictims
• Toassessthesupportprovidedtosuchvictimsandidentifybettermeanstopreventsuchcrime
• Toexaminetheexperiencesandperceptionsofthosevictimswhohaveexperiencedalawenforcement
response
Computermisusecrime(CMC)coversthecyber-dependentcrimeslargelygroupedunderthe1990Computer
MisuseActofhackingrelatedoffences,computervirus/malware/spywarerelatedinfections,denialofservice
attacksandransomware.
ThereformoftheCrimeSurveyforEnglandandWales(CSEW)withtheadditionofquestionsoncomputer
misusevictimisationhasexposedlargenumberofvictims:470,000ofcomputervirusesand500,000victimsof
unauthorisedaccesstopersonalinformationintheyearendingDecember2018–whichaccountsfor9%ofall
CSEWcrime(ONS,2019aandb).TheCyberSecurityBreachesSurveys,foundrelatingtoSMEbusinessesthat
largenumbershaveexperiencedacybersecuritybreachinthepreviousyearat60%ofmediumsizedand40%
ofsmall(Finnertyetal.,2019).
VerysmallnumbersofincidentsarerecordedbyActionFraudwith23,683in2018illustratingsignificant 
under-reportingandattrition.
METHODS AND PROFILE 
OF VICTIMS
TO CONDUCT THE RESEARCH A LITERATURE REVIEW WAS COMPLETED, 
7 STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS, 52 INTERVIEWS (38 INDIVIDUAL AND 14 
SME/O) WITH VICTIMS AND VIA 252 RESPONSES BY INDIVIDUAL VICTIMS 
TO AN ONLINE SURVEY ADMINISTERED BY QUALTRICS WERE SECURED.  
• Themajorityofvictimssecuredviathesurveyandinterviewshadexperiencedsomeformofhackingat62%
ofthesurveyand34ofthe52victimsinterviewed.
• 29%ofthesurveyvictimshadexperiencedacomputervirusorequivalentand7ofthe52victims
interviewed.
• 8%ofthesurveyvictimswereransomwarevictimsand7ofthe52victimsinterviewed.
• 1%ofthesurveyvictimshadexperiencedadenialofserviceattack,with2ofthe52victims.
• Ofthe52victimstherewerealsoonewhoexperiencedmultipleattacksand1whowasthevictimof
harassment(althoughrecordedashacking).
• Ofthe52interviewvictimsonly4hadsecuredaresponsethatresultedinacriminaljusticesanctionforthe
offender.
• Only13receivedsomeformofpoliceresponsesuchasatelephonecall,visitorcommunicationconcerning
aninvestigation.
• 18victimsreportedandreceivednofurtheraction,withafurther5whoattemptedtoreport,butwere
eitherdeniedtheopportunityortherewasnofurtheraction.12didnotreporttothepoliceorActionFraud.
Itisimportanttonotesomecaveatsrelatingtothemethodsused.Theonlinesurveyisnotrepresentative
ofwiderpopulationofcomputermisusevictims;interviewswerepurposiveanddesignedtogetaspreadof
differenttypesofrespondents;andinterviewrecallwasn’talwaysverygoodandsomevictimsstruggledto
understandwhattypeofoffencehadactuallyoccurred.
SomeofthevictimsforthisresearchweresuppliedviatheNationalFraudIntelligenceBureauandthe
categoriesvictimswereoftenrecordedunderwerenotalwaysaccurate.Forexampletherewasonevictimof
spammailclassedasahackingvictim,avictimofhackingclassifiedasransomwareandavictimofaphishing
attemptlistedasahackingvictim.
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PERCEPTION OF  
COMPUTER MISUSE CRIME 
BoththemajorityofsurveyandinterviewvictimsratedCMCaseitherequivalentormoreseriousthan
traditionalcrimessuchasburglary.Onascaleof1-20,withthelatterthemostserioussurveyvictimsrated
burglaryat9.48,whichcomparedto8.26forhackingforthrill,8.98forhackingtoviewpersonalinformation,
9.40forsendingavirus,10.3forhackingforfraud,11.06forsendingransomwareandthemosthighlyrated
was11.08forhackingforvoyeurism.TheinterviewsdidrevealasmallminoritywhoratedCMCalessercrime.
IMPACT OF COMPUTER  
MISUSE CRIME 
Boththesurveyandinterviewswithvictimshighlightedawidevarietyofimpactsthathavebeennotedwith
othertypesofcrimevictimthatincludedbroadly:financial,psychologicalandemotional,healthrelated,
reputationalaswellassomenewtypesofimpactspecifictothesetypesofcrime.Thefullreportcontainsmany
actualquotesfromvictims,withtheirpseudonymsandthefollowingboxcontainsasmallsnapshotofquotesto
illustratevictims’views.
The impact on victims in their own words
‘On the Saturday and Sunday, that was probably about six, seven hours, just for 
the eBay and PayPal. Facebook was just…that was at least six hours in the day, 
speaking to Action Fraud and the police. And going on and off and trying to do 
stuff. And then ongoing messages to them. So easily…I’d say 32 hours, I’d say.’ 
Catherine [Hacking, Individual]
‘It’s massive, the disruption in fact is massive.’
Rachael [Denial of Service Attack, Individual]
‘[He] put me through hell for a few months, and he invaded my personal world, 
and tried to take away my future and my kids’ future, that’s the way I saw it.’
Sophie [Hacking, Individual]
‘For a couple of days I just couldn’t stop crying and I felt so low, but after that, I 
think it did turn more to anger and wanting to fight to get my money back.’
Claire [Hacking, Individual]
‘The other impact of course is a 
feeling of anger, I suppose, that 
someone would put you through 
such inconvenience in an attempt 
to extort money from you; so 
mostly it was financial. I didn’t need 
any counselling. I mean it was just 
bloody annoying because when 
you’ve got work to do you want 
to get on, and some little oik has 
caused you to lose half a day’s work.’ 
Steve [Ransomware, SME]
‘Oh, very stressful. I couldn’t work. 
I didn’t have time off work, I just 
sat at my desk and stressed, not 
getting work done.’ 
Alex [Hacking, Individual]
I felt raped, you know, that 
somebody was watching 
me, so I was like I’m not 
using that laptop. 
Kathy [Hacking, SME] 
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Financial 
Thesurveyvictimsexperiencednetfinanciallossesrangingfrom£2to£10,000,withameanof£657and
medianof£250.Manyvictimsexperiencenofinanciallossatall.Somedonotexperienceadirectfinancialloss
fromthecrime,butexperiencecostsindealingwiththeconsequencesofthecrime,suchaspurchasinganti-
virussoftware,securingtechnicalsupportetc.
SomeSME/OsexperiencedsubstantialcostsindealingwiththeimpactofCMC.InonecaseanSMEincurred
over£80,000incostsdealingwiththeconsequencesoftheincident.Anotherlost£40,000and70%oftheir
customersasaresultofahackingattack.
Disruption 
ManyvictimsexperiencedisruptionasaresultofaCMC.Thiscaninvolvelossofaccesstoservices(such
asbanking,Facebooketc)ordevices,timespenttryingtodealwiththesituationandreportingitto
relevantbodies.
SomeSME/Osexperiencedmajordisruptionintheirabilitytotradeorofferservices.Someorganisations
experiencingransomwareattackslostalltheircomputerfilesandwereneverabletorecoverthemall,some
lostaccessforshortperiodscausinginterferenceinoperationsforonlyshortperiods.
Psychological and emotional impacts 
Manyvictimsnotedpsychologicalimpactssuchasanger,anxiety,fear,isolationandembarrassment.According
tothesurveythosenotinganyimpact(greatorfairamount):75%notedstress,70%anxiety,52%fear,51%
embarrassment/shame/self-blame,48%angerand43%isolation.
Health impacts
Somevictimsreportedtheincidentshadimpactsontheirphysicalormentalhealth.Accordingtothesurvey
thosenotinganyimpact(greatorfairamount):53%noteddifficultysleeping,45%panicoranxietyrelated
illness,43%depression,42%stressrelatedillnessand38%changeinappetite/weightloss/weightgain.A
further23%reportedself-harmand20%suicidalthoughts.
Damage to reputation 
SomeCMCcanleadtodamagetoreputation.Forexampleonevictiminterviewedexperienceddetailsofapast
rapebeingexposed(amongmanyotherincidents)thatdamagedherreputation.Anothervictimalmostlosta
joboffer,asaresultofahackingbyherthencurrentemployer,whichdamagedherstatuswiththeprospective
newemployer.
ForSME/Osreputationisoftenveryimportant.Severalenterprisesreportedprobablelossofbusinessasa
resultoftheincidenttheyexperienced.
Violation of the digital self 
Severalvictimsintervieweddescribedmanyoftheirdigitaldevicesandaccountsasextensionsoftheirphysical
selvesandcomparedtheattackstoactsofviolationandinsomecasesevenrape.
Loss of digital possessions 
Somevictimslamentedthelossofdigitalpossessionswhichwereorwereprobablyirretrievableasaresultof
theattackssuchasphotographsheldinaccounts,personaldocumentsoremailaccounts.
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FALLING VICTIM 
THE INTERVIEWS AND THE SURVEY PROVIDED A GREAT DEAL OF 
INFORMATION ON THE SECURITY BEHAVIOURS BEFORE AND AFTER  
THE INCIDENT. 
Security behaviours 
Theinterviewsrevealedawiderangeofreasonsastowhytheyhadfallenvictimtothecrime.Therewerealso
somewhohadnoideahowtheyhadfallenvictim.
Severalvictimsdescribed‘weakpoint’momentswheretheydescribedwhattheyconsideredgenerallystrong
resilience,butbecauseofthecircumstancesofaparticulartimetheyhadfallenvictimtoCMC.Theseincluded
beinginarush,focusonspecifictaskorwiderpersonalissues.Thesewereoftenthenabletobeexploitedby
goodsocialengineeringbythecriminals.
Somevictimsreportedpoorsecurityhabitssuchaspoorpasswords,usingthesamepasswordsandeasily
guessablepasswords,suchasfamilynames.
Severalvictimsreportedtousingeithernoanti-virus,freeversionsornotupdatingit.
Riskybehaviourswereadmittedbysomevictimsasaprobablecauseoftheirincident,suchasvisitingunlawful
sitestowatchpiratedmovies.
MostoftheSME/Ovictimshadnoknowledgeofcybersecuritystandardseitherbeforeoraftertheincidents.
TherewerealsovictimsbothindividualandSME/Owhoreportedexcellentsecurityknowledgeandapplication,
butwhostillbecamevictims.
Victims’ response to victimisation 
Boththesurveyandinterviewsfoundthattherewasgenerallylimitedchangesinbehaviourasaresultof
victimisationandthatformanyvictimssecuritybehaviourswerenotstrong.
Thesurveyfoundtherewasasmallincreaseinuseofdevicepasscodes,softwareupdates,databack-upsand
reporting;andadecreaseintheuseofdeviceandwebsitepasswordmanagers.Buttherewasnosignificant
changeinapproachtoprotectiveauthenticationthroughstrongpasswordsand2FAforemailaccounts.
Italsofoundtheexperienceofharmisunlikelytoleadtoasignificantincreaseinprotectivebehaviours,with
onlyaminorityofpersonsmorecautiousandthemajoritynotchangingtheirbehaviour.  
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REPORTING COMPUTER 
MISUSE CRIME 
THE RESEARCH DISCOVERED A VARIETY OF FINDINGS ON THE REASONS 
FOR NON-REPORTING OF CMC AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THOSE WHO 
DO TRY TO REPORT. 
Reasons for low reporting 
Thereweremanyfactorsthatcontributedtowardslowreporting.Theseincluded:
• Somevictimsnotconsideringsuchincidentsascrimes
• Nofinanciallossoccurring
• Reputationand/orpastexperienceofActionFraudaspoor
• Victimswronglyadvisedbypolice/ActionFraudtheirreportwasnotacrime
• VictimsneverheardofActionFraud
• Embarrassmentorfearofconsequencesofreporting
Theresearchalsofoundotherserviceproviderswherevictimsoftenreportfirst,suchasGoogle,Facebook,
banksetcdonotalwaysclearlysuggestreportingsuchincidentstoActionFraud.Policewebsiteswerenot
alwayscleareitheronwheretoreportsuchcybercrimeandtheActionFraudwebsitewasmorefocusedupon
fraudthanCMC.
Reporting experience 
SomevictimsofCMC,particularlyhackingvictims,startwiththerelevantprovideroftheservicewherethe
hackhasoccurredtoreport,suchasbanks,Facebook,Gmailetc.Forsomevictimsthisistheendofthe
reportingprocess,forothersitisfollowedbyareporttothepoliceorActionFraud.Thesurveyandinterview
datagenerallyillustratedapositiveexperiencewithsuchproviders,particularlythebanks.However,there
weresomevictimswhichhighlightedchallengeswithspeakingtoandsecuringactionfromsomeprovidersof
servicesviatheinternet.
RegardingreportingtothepoliceandActionFraudvictimshadmadeuseofbothwebsites,thetelephone
andreportedinperson.ThosereportingtothepoliceweregenerallyunawareofActionFraudandsomejust
wantedtoreporttothepolice.
Regardingthepoliceasignificantnumberwhoreportedtothepolicedidsovia999(36%ofpolicereports).
ForboththepoliceandActionFraudthegeneralsatisfactionwiththereportingexperiencewaspositivewith
justover2/3stronglyortendingtoagreetheirreportingexperiencewerepositive.Overall,however,thiswas
slightlylowerthanotherorganisationsthatarereportedto(banks,Facebooketc).Therewere,however,some
negativeareaswheretherewasroomforimprovementintheservices.
Somevictimsstruggledtosecurepoliceacceptanceoftheircasewhentherewasclearevidenceofacrime.
Husky(anindividualhackingvictim)waswronglyadvisedherestrangedhusbandhackingandmonitoringher
laptopwasnotacrimebecausetheystilllivedtogether.Sam(anindividualhackingvictim)waswronglyadvised
thehackingofherwebcamwasnotacrime.InanothercaseAlex(anindividualhackingvictim)startedwith
thepolice,wasreferredtoActionFraud,whothenreferredhimbacktothepolice.Wherecasesarecomplex
involvingoffendingovermultipleforcestherewasalsoevidenceofmixedresponses.
ThetelephonereportingexperienceofActionFraudwasgenerallypositiveforthevictims.Forthewebsiteit
wasmoremixed,althoughmostofthevictimsinterviewedreportedtoActionFraudbeforethesubsequent
changestotheActionFraudwebsitereportingpages.
Therewasfrustrationamongvictimsattheperceivedoractuallackofaction.Somevictimshadreportedto
ActionFraudandheardnothing.SomehadheardnewsfromActionFraud,butthiswastosaytherewouldbe
nofurtheraction,whichwasdisappointingtothem.Somevictimsclaimedtheyhadreceivednoinformationon
howthecasehadprogressed.
Itisalsoimportanttonotetherewerealsoasmallnumberofvictimswhowerealsoveryhappywiththeir
responsefromthepolice,ActionFraudetc;eveninsomecaseswheretherewasnoinvestigationorno
identificationoftheoffender.
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Advice and support received 
Theinterviewvictimswhoreportedgenerallydidnotreceiveextensivesupportfromthepolice/ActionFraud.
Otherthanletters,fewrecalledanysubstantivesupporttobetterequipthemtopreventfutureincidents.
Websitelinksonletterswerenotalwaysfollowedupbyvictimsorevenrecalledbysome.
Thewebsitesthatofferadviceandsupportgenerallyhadlowrecognitionamongvictims,bothbeforeandafter
theincident.
Amongthevictimsinterviewedasmallnumberreceivedatelephonecallfromthepoliceandsomeavisit.
Most,however,didnotreceivethis,withaverysmallnumberreceivingnoresponseandsomejustaletter/
emailwithnofurtherfollowuporupdatesontheircase.SMEvictimsofRansomwarewerethemostlikelyto
receiveavisit,butinmostcasestherewaslittlethepolicecoulddo.
Veryfewvictimsexperiencedapoliceinvestigationandevenlessasuccessfulinvestigation.Ofthe52victims
interviewedonly4resultedinaconviction/cautionfortheoffender(s)and3oftheserelatedtoNCAcases.
VICTIMS NEEDS 
THE SURVEY IDENTIFIED IMMEDIATE SUPPORT SUCH AS WHERE TO GO 
TO, WHO TO TALK TO AS THE HIGHEST RANKING NEED (82% RATED VERY 
OR FAIRLY IMPORTANT), FOLLOWED BY TECHNICAL SUPPORT (76.2%), 
INFORMATION SUPPORT (74.6%), EMOTIONAL SUPPORT (64%) AND 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT (63.5%) AS THE FIVE HIGHEST. 
Theinterviewshighlightedsomeofthese.Manyvictimsdidnotknowwhathadhappenedandwantedtoknow
whathadoccurredtothemandtofindoutwhattheauthoritiesweredoing.
TechnicalsupportwasasignificantneedamongmanyvictimsandparticularlysomeSMEs.Formanyofthese
theCMCcauseddisruptionwhichaffectedthebusiness/organisationandtoreturntonormalrequiredexpert
helpnotintheorganisation.Forexampleransomwarevictimswantedsupportinaccessinglostfilesand
cleaningcomputers.Theimmediatepointoftheincidentwaswhenmanyvictimswantedtechnicalsupport.
Severalvictimswantedtobesuretheirdeviceswerecleanandwantedexternalreassurancetoachievethis.
Technicaladvicetobetterprotectforthefuturewasalsowanted.
Somevictimswereunsurewheretosecuresuchtechnicaladviceandreliedonfriends/family’s
recommendationsorestablishedbrandssuchasPCWorld.
Severalvictimswantedjusticeandfortheperpetratorstobebroughttojustice.
Somevictimsjustwantedreassurancetoknowtheywerenolongeratriskfromattackandthattheincident
hadpassed.
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CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THIS RESEARCH HAS PROVIDED SOME IMPORTANT NEW DATA ON 
VICTIMS OF CMC. 
FirstithasshownthatmostvictimsregardCMCasanequivalentcrimetotraditionalcrimeslikeburglary,
withsomeconsideringitmoreserious,withasmallminorityregardingitasalessercrime.Theresearch
demonstratedvictimsexperiencemanyoftheimpactsthatothercrimevictimsexperience,withsomeoverlap
withfraud.Therewerealsosomevictimswhosufferedsevereimpacts,aswellassomenotingverysmall
impactsandregardingitaslittlemorethandisruption.
Theresearchexploredhowvictimsfellvictimandshowedinsomecasestheyweretrickedbysophisticated
socialengineering,someexhibitedpoorsecuritybehavioursputtingthematgreaterrisk,butsomealso
hadverygoodbehavioursbutstillfellvictim.Theresearchexploredthechangesinbehaviourasaresultof
victimisationanditshowedingeneraltherewerenotmajorchanges.Thereasonsvictimsdidnotreportwere
examinedandthentheexperiencesofthosethatdid.TheresponseofthepoliceandActionFraud,wherethere
wasaresponsewasalsoexplored.Thereportendedbyconsideringwhatthevictimswanted.
Thefindingsfromthisresearchledtheauthorstomakethefollowingrecommendations,whichfallunder
thefollowingcategories:improvingreporting,improvingvictimsupportandadvice,increasingresourcesfor
tacklingcomputermisuse.
Improving reporting
Theexperienceoftheresearchersdealingwithvictimsandtryingtounderstandtheirinterpretationsofwhat
happenedillustratedthechallengesofdefinition.ThiswashighlightedfurtherwithdatasuppliedbytheNFIB,
whichshowedtherehadbeenmisclassificationofvictims,notjustamongwebreporters.Theresearchwas
conductedwithdatadrawnbeforechangestotheonlinereportingsystemandbetterqualitycheckswere
introduced.Manyoftheseissuesmaythereforehavealreadybeenaddressed.However,itisessentialthat
thosereportingcybercrimesareproperlyclassifiedforbothmeasurement,investigationandresponseissues.
Recommendation 1
The new systems for reporting, classifying and ensuring the quality of decisions undertaken by Action Fraud 
and National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) should be regularly monitored and evaluated to ensure the 
classification of CMC reports for both telephone and web reporting are being classified accurately [Directed 
at Action Fraud/NFIB]. 
ThecentralchallengeofthenameActionFraudisformanyvictimsthisdoesnotsoundlikeabodycybercrime
shouldbereportedto,particularlywhenitdoesnotinvolvefraud.AnotherchallengetoreportingCMC(and
fraud)isthenameActionFraudandtheassociationoftheword‘Action’withinvestigationandresponse,rather
thanreporting.Somevictimsactuallythinkitisaspecialfraudinvestigationsquad,whichimpliestherewillbe
aninvestigationbyActionFraud.Forthesereasonstheresearchersthinkthenameshouldbechanged.
Recommendation 2
Action Fraud should be renamed the ‘National Fraud and Cybercrime Reporting Centre’ [Directed at Home 
Office, City of London Police].
ThisreportidentifiedanumberofbarrierstoindividualsreportingCMCoffences.Thereareanumberof
recommendationsbelowwhichaidedwithafocusedcommunicationstrategycouldenhancereporting:
Recommendation 3 
Greater prominence should be made of CMC offences on the Action Fraud website [Directed at Action Fraud]. 
Recommendation 4
All police reporting websites should be reviewed to assess information provided on reporting CMC and 
where there are gaps advised to more clearly indicate how cybercrime can be reported with relevant links 
provided [Directed to Home Office and all police forces].  
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Recommendations 5
The NCSC should work with key bodies such as Action Fraud, Getsafeonline; relevant service providers, such 
as banks, social networking sites, email providers etc who receive cybercrime reports, to provide a common 
set of words and website links to be placed upon their website to encourage them to report as crime 
[Directed to NCSC, Action Fraud and relevant website providers].  
Therewasalsoevidenceofsomestaffwhomightreceiveoradviseonreportsdidnotgraspthelegislation
relatingtoCMC,particularlyrelatedtonon-financialrelatedcrimesuchasharassment,voyeurismanddomestic
disputeswheretheresearchfoundexamplesofvictimsbeingwronglyadvisedtheircasewasnotacrime.The
authorsthereforesuggestthatallrelevantpolicestaffandActionFraudstaffshouldreceivetraininginCMC
offencesandwheresuchtrainingalreadyoccurs,itshouldberegularlyreviewedtoensurethoseexperiencingit
clearlyunderstandwhatconstitutesthistypeofcrime,theseriousnessofitandoptionsforvictims:
Recommendation 6 
All police officers, police staff and Action Fraud staff dealing with victims who may report crimes should be 
better trained in what constitutes CMC offences, particularly in relation to non-financial related cases such 
as voyeurism, harassment and domestic disputes; and the options for dealing with them [Directed to Home 
Office, College of Policing, Action Fraud]. 
Improving victim support and advice
Thefindingsnotedlimitedchangesinbehaviourbysomevictimsfromthesurveyandinterviews.Therewere
examplesofvictimswhowerehackednotimprovingtheirpasswordsecurityandcomputervirusvictimsnot
engagingwithanti-virussoftware.Someoftheinterviewvictimsatthepointofvictimisationwereclearly
interestedincybersecurity,butwerenotofferedappropriatetailoredadvice.Thisseemedtobeamissed
opportunityatthepointofvictimisationtoenhancetheresilienceofthevictim.TheEconomicCrimeVictimCare
Unit(ECVCU)pilotisanillustrationofmovestomoreintensivesupportforthistypeofvictim.Thisresearchhas
notevaluatedtheECVCUandsomeofitsactivitieswouldoverlapwiththefollowingrecommendation:
Recommendation 7
Tailored packages of advice/support (based on National Cyber Security Centre guidance/advice) relating to 
the specific type of incident should be supplied to the victim at the point of reporting and evaluation of this 
support should be undertaken regularly to improve it [Directed at Action Fraud and the NCSC].
Recommendation 8
Further research should be conducted to evaluate different approaches to targeting victims and the impact 
these have on behaviours and future victimisation [Directed at Home Office]. 
Therewasevidenceofvictimsnotreceivinginformationontheprogressoftheircase,whichiscontrarytothe
VictimsCode.Therewasalsoconsiderablevariationinthenatureandextentoftheresponsesvictimsreceived.
Recommendation 9
Action Fraud and the police should do more to ensure victims do receive timely information on what has 
occurred in relation to their case [Directed at the police and Action Fraud]. 
TheActionFraudwebsitewasthemostrecognisedbyvictims,buttheresearchteam’sviewswerethatitwas
notnecessarilythebestatsupplyinginformationtovictimsonprevention,supportetcofCMCrelatedoffences.
GetsafeonlineandtheNationalCyberSecurityCentreprovidedthebestadviceintheviewoftheresearch
team,butwerelowdowntherecognitionlistofvictims.ActionFraudcouldeitherdevelopnewwebsiteorlink
inamoreeffectivewaytothebetterwebsites.Itmightalsobeprudenttoconductsomeresearchwithvictims
todeterminethemosteffectivewebsitesforofferingadvice.
Recommendation 10
Action Fraud, with the most recognised website offering advice, should work with the National Cyber 
Security Centre to ensure consistent and technically accurate advice on preventing and dealing with 
cybercrime is provided to victims. This should also be built upon research to determine the most effective 
websites for interesting and changing the behaviour of victims [Directed at Home Office, Action Fraud, 
National Cyber Security Centre]. 
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Increasing resources for tackling computer misuse
Thefindingsforthisresearchfoundmanyvictimswhodidnotreceiveapoliceinvestigationoranyotherform
ofpoliceinterest.Somevictimsdidnotwantanypolicesupport,butmanydid.Therewerealsocaseswhere
victimsthoughttheyhadclearleadsonwhotheoffenderswere(althoughinrealitythoseleadsmayhavebeen
weak),butnothingoccurred.Itisclearthatmanyvictimswhowantpolicesupportdonotreceiveit.Thereare
clearlynotenoughresourcesofthepolicededicatedtoCMCandmanyoftheresourcesthatdoexistarebuilt
uponshort-termfunding,withnoguaranteetheywillcontinue(HMICFRS,2019).Theauthorsbelievemore
resourcesshouldbededicatedtothiscrime,howmuch,however,isclearlyapoliticaldecisionwhenthereare
somanydemandsonthepolice.
Recommendation 11
The police should dedicate greater resources towards tackling CMC [Directed at the Government, Home 
Office and the police]. 
Itisclearthatevenwithmoreresourcesthepolicecouldnotfillthegapinthesupportthatvictimswant.
Technicalsupportwasoneofthemainneedsidentifiedbyvictimsandmanyofthedemandsthatfallunderthis
wouldnotnecessarilybesomethingthepolicecouldorshouldprovide,particularlyinrelationtoSMEs.Thereis
achallenge,however,ofwheretogotosecuretechnicaladviceandwhototrust.Thereareotherexamplesin
physicalsecurityofofficialschemestoindicatecompliancewithstandardsandthattheoperatorisalegitimate
suppliersuchastheSecurityIndustryAuthority’sApprovedContractorSchemeandthepoliceservice’sSecured
byDesigninitiative.TheNationalCyberSecurityCentrehasavarietyofcertificationprogrammes,butthesedo
notcurrentlycoverprovidersofcybersecurityservicesatthefrontlineofvictims.Aschemethatprovidesakite
markofapprovalandlistofsuppliersthatcouldbeprovidedtoindividualandSMEvictimswouldaidthemin
securingappropriateprofessionalsupport.
Recommendation 12
The Government should encourage a scheme to recognise suppliers who are accredited to appropriate 
standards to provide cyber security technical services to individuals and SMEs, similar to schemes such as 
Secured by Design and the SIA’s Approved Contractors Scheme. Victims could then be provided with links to 
a website which includes a list of relevant suppliers who have met those standards [Directed at the Home 
Office and National Cyber Security Centre and the NPCC]. 
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‘Yeah. The doctor said I couldn’t cope with what was going 
on because my mind was racing, I didn’t trust anybody, I was 
very withdrawn and literally within three months he doubled 
the dose and that’s stabilised me.’
Leo [Hacking, individual] 
‘…it’s going to sound really melodramatic, but at times it was life-
threatening to me…anything could happen…and I would be a couple of 
times sat on the bridge wanting to throw myself off a bridge.’
Wayne [Harassment, individual]
‘I felt powerless, angry, violated in a way, very angry and angry because 
nobody would listen to it, ‘cause I kind of put my trust in the police, 
thinking that I’d just been kind of dismissed in a way, just another 
domestic situation.’
Husky [Hacking, Individual]
‘…they [the police] really underestimate the impact on a 
human being, you know. When it reaches the point where 
you, as I said earlier, you feel like you’ve been physically 
assaulted, then it should be treated as assault of some sort.’
Patricia [Multiple, individual]
13EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  |  VICTIMS OF COMPUTER MISUSE
14 VICTIMS OF COMPUTER MISUSE  |  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contact details
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
StGeorgesBuilding
UniversityofPortsmouth
PortsmouthPO12HY
UnitedKingdom
+44(0)2392845588
port.ac.uk/research/research-centres-and-groups/
centre-for-counter-fraud-studies
CC-938 0420
